mirror of
https://github.com/emmansun/gmsm.git
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2192 lines
72 KiB
Go
2192 lines
72 KiB
Go
// Package smx509 parses X.509-encoded keys and certificates include SM2/SM3 support.
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//
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// It allows parsing and generating certificates, certificate signing
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// requests, certificate revocation lists, and encoded public and private keys.
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// It provides a certificate verifier, complete with a chain builder.
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//
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// The package targets the X.509 technical profile defined by the IETF (RFC
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// 2459/3280/5280), and as further restricted by the CA/Browser Forum Baseline
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// Requirements. There is minimal support for features outside of these
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// profiles, as the primary goal of the package is to provide compatibility
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// with the publicly trusted TLS certificate ecosystem and its policies and
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// constraints.
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//
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// On Windows, certificate verification is handled by system APIs, but
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// the package aims to apply consistent validation rules across operating
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// systems.
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//
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// On macOS, we did NOT support to use system root CA yet due to too many SDK internal
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// package's dependencies.
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package smx509
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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cryptorand "crypto/rand"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/sha1"
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"crypto/x509"
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"crypto/x509/pkix"
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"encoding/asn1"
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"encoding/pem"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"math/big"
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"net"
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"net/url"
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"time"
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"unicode"
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// Explicitly import these for their crypto.RegisterHash init side-effects.
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// Keep these as blank imports, even if they're imported above.
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_ "crypto/sha1"
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_ "crypto/sha256"
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_ "crypto/sha512"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
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cryptobyte_asn1 "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1"
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"github.com/emmansun/gmsm/ecdh"
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"github.com/emmansun/gmsm/internal/godebug"
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"github.com/emmansun/gmsm/sm2"
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)
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// pkixPublicKey reflects a PKIX public key structure. See SubjectPublicKeyInfo
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// in RFC 3280.
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type pkixPublicKey struct {
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Algo pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
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BitString asn1.BitString
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}
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// ParsePKIXPublicKey parses a public key in PKIX, ASN.1 DER form.
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// The encoded public key is a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure
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// (see RFC 5280, Section 4.1).
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//
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// It returns a *rsa.PublicKey, *dsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey, or
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// ed25519.PublicKey. More types might be supported in the future.
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//
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// This kind of key is commonly encoded in PEM blocks of type "PUBLIC KEY".
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func ParsePKIXPublicKey(derBytes []byte) (any, error) {
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var pki publicKeyInfo
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if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(derBytes, &pki); err != nil {
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if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(derBytes, &pkcs1PublicKey{}); err == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to parse public key (use ParsePKCS1PublicKey instead for this key format)")
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}
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return nil, err
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} else if len(rest) != 0 {
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return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after ASN.1 of public-key")
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}
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return parsePublicKey(&pki)
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}
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func marshalPublicKey(pub any) (publicKeyBytes []byte, publicKeyAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier, err error) {
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switch pub := pub.(type) {
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case *rsa.PublicKey:
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publicKeyBytes, err = asn1.Marshal(pkcs1PublicKey{
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N: pub.N,
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E: pub.E,
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})
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if err != nil {
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return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, err
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}
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publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm = oidPublicKeyRSA
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// This is a NULL parameters value which is required by
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// RFC 3279, Section 2.3.1.
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publicKeyAlgorithm.Parameters = asn1.NullRawValue
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case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
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oid, ok := oidFromNamedCurve(pub.Curve)
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if !ok {
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return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, errors.New("x509: unsupported elliptic curve")
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}
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if !pub.Curve.IsOnCurve(pub.X, pub.Y) {
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return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, errors.New("x509: invalid elliptic curve public key")
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}
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publicKeyBytes = elliptic.Marshal(pub.Curve, pub.X, pub.Y)
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publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm = oidPublicKeyECDSA
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var paramBytes []byte
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paramBytes, err = asn1.Marshal(oid)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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publicKeyAlgorithm.Parameters.FullBytes = paramBytes
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case ed25519.PublicKey:
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publicKeyBytes = pub
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publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm = oidPublicKeyEd25519
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case *ecdh.PublicKey: //TODO:will add SDK ECDH public key support from golang 1.19 later.
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publicKeyBytes = pub.Bytes()
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oid, ok := oidFromECDHCurve(pub.Curve())
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if !ok {
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return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, errors.New("x509: unsupported elliptic curve")
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}
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publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm = oidPublicKeyECDSA
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var paramBytes []byte
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paramBytes, err = asn1.Marshal(oid)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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publicKeyAlgorithm.Parameters.FullBytes = paramBytes
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default:
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return nil, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{}, fmt.Errorf("x509: unsupported public key type: %T", pub)
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}
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return publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, nil
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}
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// MarshalPKIXPublicKey converts a public key to PKIX, ASN.1 DER form.
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// The encoded public key is a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure
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// (see RFC 5280, Section 4.1).
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//
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// The following key types are currently supported: *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey
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// and ed25519.PublicKey. Unsupported key types result in an error.
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//
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// This kind of key is commonly encoded in PEM blocks of type "PUBLIC KEY".
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func MarshalPKIXPublicKey(pub any) ([]byte, error) {
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var publicKeyBytes []byte
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var publicKeyAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
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var err error
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if publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, err = marshalPublicKey(pub); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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pkix := pkixPublicKey{
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Algo: publicKeyAlgorithm,
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BitString: asn1.BitString{
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Bytes: publicKeyBytes,
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BitLength: 8 * len(publicKeyBytes),
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},
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}
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ret, _ := asn1.Marshal(pkix)
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return ret, nil
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}
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// These structures reflect the ASN.1 structure of X.509 certificates.:
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type certificate struct {
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TBSCertificate tbsCertificate
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SignatureAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
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SignatureValue asn1.BitString
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}
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type tbsCertificate struct {
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Raw asn1.RawContent
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Version int `asn1:"optional,explicit,default:0,tag:0"`
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SerialNumber *big.Int
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SignatureAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
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Issuer asn1.RawValue
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Validity validity
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Subject asn1.RawValue
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PublicKey publicKeyInfo
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UniqueId asn1.BitString `asn1:"optional,tag:1"`
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SubjectUniqueId asn1.BitString `asn1:"optional,tag:2"`
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Extensions []pkix.Extension `asn1:"omitempty,optional,explicit,tag:3"`
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}
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type dsaAlgorithmParameters struct {
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P, Q, G *big.Int
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}
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type validity struct {
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NotBefore, NotAfter time.Time
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}
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type publicKeyInfo struct {
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Raw asn1.RawContent
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Algorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
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PublicKey asn1.BitString
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}
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// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.1
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type authKeyId struct {
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Id []byte `asn1:"optional,tag:0"`
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}
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type SignatureAlgorithm = x509.SignatureAlgorithm
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const (
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UnknownSignatureAlgorithm = x509.UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
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MD2WithRSA = x509.MD2WithRSA // Unsupported.
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MD5WithRSA = x509.MD5WithRSA // Only supported for signing, not verification.
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SHA1WithRSA = x509.SHA1WithRSA // Only supported for signing, and verification of CRLs, CSRs, and OCSP responses.
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SHA256WithRSA = x509.SHA256WithRSA
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SHA384WithRSA = x509.SHA384WithRSA
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SHA512WithRSA = x509.SHA512WithRSA
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DSAWithSHA1 = x509.DSAWithSHA1 // Unsupported.
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DSAWithSHA256 = x509.DSAWithSHA256 // Unsupported.
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ECDSAWithSHA1 = x509.ECDSAWithSHA1 // Only supported for signing, and verification of CRLs, CSRs, and OCSP responses.
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ECDSAWithSHA256 = x509.ECDSAWithSHA256
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ECDSAWithSHA384 = x509.ECDSAWithSHA384
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ECDSAWithSHA512 = x509.ECDSAWithSHA512
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SHA256WithRSAPSS = x509.SHA256WithRSAPSS
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SHA384WithRSAPSS = x509.SHA384WithRSAPSS
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SHA512WithRSAPSS = x509.SHA512WithRSAPSS
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PureEd25519 = x509.PureEd25519
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SM2WithSM3 SignatureAlgorithm = 99 // Make sure the vaule is not conflict with x509.SignatureAlgorithm
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)
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func isRSAPSS(algo SignatureAlgorithm) bool {
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for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails {
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if details.algo == algo {
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return details.isRSAPSS
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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func hashFunc(algo SignatureAlgorithm) crypto.Hash {
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for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails {
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if details.algo == algo {
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return details.hash
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}
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}
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return crypto.Hash(0)
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}
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type PublicKeyAlgorithm = x509.PublicKeyAlgorithm
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const (
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UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm = x509.UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm
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RSA = x509.RSA
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DSA = x509.DSA // Only supported for parsing.
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ECDSA = x509.ECDSA
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Ed25519 = x509.Ed25519
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)
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// OIDs for signature algorithms
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//
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// pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
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// iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 }
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//
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// RFC 3279 2.2.1 RSA Signature Algorithms
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//
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// md2WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 2 }
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//
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// md5WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 4 }
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//
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// sha-1WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 5 }
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//
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// dsaWithSha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
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// iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9cm(4) 3 }
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//
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// RFC 3279 2.2.3 ECDSA Signature Algorithm
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//
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// ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
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// iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x962(10045)
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// signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA1(1)}
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//
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// RFC 4055 5 PKCS #1 Version 1.5
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//
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// sha256WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 11 }
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//
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// sha384WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 12 }
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//
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// sha512WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 13 }
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//
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// RFC 5758 3.1 DSA Signature Algorithms
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//
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// dsaWithSha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
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// joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
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// csor(3) algorithms(4) id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 2}
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//
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// RFC 5758 3.2 ECDSA Signature Algorithm
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//
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// ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
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// us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }
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//
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// ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
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// us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }
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//
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// ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
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// us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 }
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//
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// RFC 8410 3 Curve25519 and Curve448 Algorithm Identifiers
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//
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// id-Ed25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 112 }
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var (
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oidSignatureMD2WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 2}
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oidSignatureMD5WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 4}
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oidSignatureSHA1WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 5}
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oidSignatureSHA256WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 11}
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oidSignatureSHA384WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 12}
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oidSignatureSHA512WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 13}
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oidSignatureRSAPSS = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 10}
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oidSignatureDSAWithSHA1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10040, 4, 3}
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oidSignatureDSAWithSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 3, 2}
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oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 1}
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oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 2}
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oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA384 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 3}
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oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA512 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 4}
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oidSignatureEd25519 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 101, 112}
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oidSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 1}
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oidSHA384 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 2}
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oidSHA512 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 3}
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oidMGF1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 8}
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// oidISOSignatureSHA1WithRSA means the same as oidSignatureSHA1WithRSA
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// but it's specified by ISO. Microsoft's makecert.exe has been known
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// to produce certificates with this OID.
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oidISOSignatureSHA1WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 14, 3, 2, 29}
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// GB/T 33560-2017 信息安全技术 密码应用标识规范
|
||
// 附录A（规范性附录）商用密码领域中的相关OID定义
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//
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// http://gmssl.org/docs/oid.html
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oidSignatureSM2WithSM3 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 156, 10197, 1, 501}
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//oidSignatureSM2WithSHA1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 156, 10197, 1, 502}
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//oidSignatureSM2WithSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 156, 10197, 1, 503}
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)
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var signatureAlgorithmDetails = []struct {
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algo SignatureAlgorithm
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name string
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oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier
|
||
params asn1.RawValue
|
||
pubKeyAlgo PublicKeyAlgorithm
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hash crypto.Hash
|
||
isRSAPSS bool
|
||
}{
|
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{MD2WithRSA, "MD2-RSA", oidSignatureMD2WithRSA, asn1.NullRawValue, RSA, crypto.Hash(0) /* no value for MD2 */, false},
|
||
{MD5WithRSA, "MD5-RSA", oidSignatureMD5WithRSA, asn1.NullRawValue, RSA, crypto.MD5, false},
|
||
{SHA1WithRSA, "SHA1-RSA", oidSignatureSHA1WithRSA, asn1.NullRawValue, RSA, crypto.SHA1, false},
|
||
{SHA1WithRSA, "SHA1-RSA", oidISOSignatureSHA1WithRSA, asn1.NullRawValue, RSA, crypto.SHA1, false},
|
||
{SHA256WithRSA, "SHA256-RSA", oidSignatureSHA256WithRSA, asn1.NullRawValue, RSA, crypto.SHA256, false},
|
||
{SHA384WithRSA, "SHA384-RSA", oidSignatureSHA384WithRSA, asn1.NullRawValue, RSA, crypto.SHA384, false},
|
||
{SHA512WithRSA, "SHA512-RSA", oidSignatureSHA512WithRSA, asn1.NullRawValue, RSA, crypto.SHA512, false},
|
||
{SHA256WithRSAPSS, "SHA256-RSAPSS", oidSignatureRSAPSS, pssParametersSHA256, RSA, crypto.SHA256, true},
|
||
{SHA384WithRSAPSS, "SHA384-RSAPSS", oidSignatureRSAPSS, pssParametersSHA384, RSA, crypto.SHA384, true},
|
||
{SHA512WithRSAPSS, "SHA512-RSAPSS", oidSignatureRSAPSS, pssParametersSHA512, RSA, crypto.SHA512, true},
|
||
{DSAWithSHA1, "DSA-SHA1", oidSignatureDSAWithSHA1, emptyRawValue, DSA, crypto.SHA1, false},
|
||
{DSAWithSHA256, "DSA-SHA256", oidSignatureDSAWithSHA256, emptyRawValue, DSA, crypto.SHA256, false},
|
||
{ECDSAWithSHA1, "ECDSA-SHA1", oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA1, emptyRawValue, ECDSA, crypto.SHA1, false},
|
||
{ECDSAWithSHA256, "ECDSA-SHA256", oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA256, emptyRawValue, ECDSA, crypto.SHA256, false},
|
||
{ECDSAWithSHA384, "ECDSA-SHA384", oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA384, emptyRawValue, ECDSA, crypto.SHA384, false},
|
||
{ECDSAWithSHA512, "ECDSA-SHA512", oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA512, emptyRawValue, ECDSA, crypto.SHA512, false},
|
||
{PureEd25519, "Ed25519", oidSignatureEd25519, emptyRawValue, Ed25519, crypto.Hash(0) /* no pre-hashing */, false},
|
||
{SM2WithSM3, "SM2-SM3", oidSignatureSM2WithSM3, emptyRawValue, ECDSA, crypto.Hash(0) /* no pre-hashing */, false},
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
var emptyRawValue = asn1.RawValue{}
|
||
|
||
// DER encoded RSA PSS parameters for the
|
||
// SHA256, SHA384, and SHA512 hashes as defined in RFC 3447, Appendix A.2.3.
|
||
// The parameters contain the following values:
|
||
// - hashAlgorithm contains the associated hash identifier with NULL parameters
|
||
// - maskGenAlgorithm always contains the default mgf1SHA1 identifier
|
||
// - saltLength contains the length of the associated hash
|
||
// - trailerField always contains the default trailerFieldBC value
|
||
var (
|
||
pssParametersSHA256 = asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: []byte{48, 52, 160, 15, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 1, 5, 0, 161, 28, 48, 26, 6, 9, 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, 8, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 1, 5, 0, 162, 3, 2, 1, 32}}
|
||
pssParametersSHA384 = asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: []byte{48, 52, 160, 15, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 2, 5, 0, 161, 28, 48, 26, 6, 9, 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, 8, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 2, 5, 0, 162, 3, 2, 1, 48}}
|
||
pssParametersSHA512 = asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: []byte{48, 52, 160, 15, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 3, 5, 0, 161, 28, 48, 26, 6, 9, 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, 8, 48, 13, 6, 9, 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 3, 5, 0, 162, 3, 2, 1, 64}}
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
// pssParameters reflects the parameters in an AlgorithmIdentifier that
|
||
// specifies RSA PSS. See RFC 3447, Appendix A.2.3.
|
||
type pssParameters struct {
|
||
// The following three fields are not marked as
|
||
// optional because the default values specify SHA-1,
|
||
// which is no longer suitable for use in signatures.
|
||
Hash pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier `asn1:"explicit,tag:0"`
|
||
MGF pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier `asn1:"explicit,tag:1"`
|
||
SaltLength int `asn1:"explicit,tag:2"`
|
||
TrailerField int `asn1:"optional,explicit,tag:3,default:1"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(ai pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier) SignatureAlgorithm {
|
||
if ai.Algorithm.Equal(oidSignatureEd25519) {
|
||
// RFC 8410, Section 3
|
||
// > For all of the OIDs, the parameters MUST be absent.
|
||
if len(ai.Parameters.FullBytes) != 0 {
|
||
return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if !ai.Algorithm.Equal(oidSignatureRSAPSS) {
|
||
for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails {
|
||
if ai.Algorithm.Equal(details.oid) {
|
||
return details.algo
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// RSA PSS is special because it encodes important parameters
|
||
// in the Parameters.
|
||
|
||
var params pssParameters
|
||
if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(ai.Parameters.FullBytes, ¶ms); err != nil {
|
||
return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
var mgf1HashFunc pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
|
||
if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(params.MGF.Parameters.FullBytes, &mgf1HashFunc); err != nil {
|
||
return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// PSS is greatly overburdened with options. This code forces them into
|
||
// three buckets by requiring that the MGF1 hash function always match the
|
||
// message hash function (as recommended in RFC 3447, Section 8.1), that the
|
||
// salt length matches the hash length, and that the trailer field has the
|
||
// default value.
|
||
if (len(params.Hash.Parameters.FullBytes) != 0 && !bytes.Equal(params.Hash.Parameters.FullBytes, asn1.NullBytes)) ||
|
||
!params.MGF.Algorithm.Equal(oidMGF1) ||
|
||
!mgf1HashFunc.Algorithm.Equal(params.Hash.Algorithm) ||
|
||
(len(mgf1HashFunc.Parameters.FullBytes) != 0 && !bytes.Equal(mgf1HashFunc.Parameters.FullBytes, asn1.NullBytes)) ||
|
||
params.TrailerField != 1 {
|
||
return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
switch {
|
||
case params.Hash.Algorithm.Equal(oidSHA256) && params.SaltLength == 32:
|
||
return SHA256WithRSAPSS
|
||
case params.Hash.Algorithm.Equal(oidSHA384) && params.SaltLength == 48:
|
||
return SHA384WithRSAPSS
|
||
case params.Hash.Algorithm.Equal(oidSHA512) && params.SaltLength == 64:
|
||
return SHA512WithRSAPSS
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
var (
|
||
// RFC 3279, 2.3 Public Key Algorithms
|
||
//
|
||
// pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::== { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
|
||
// rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 }
|
||
//
|
||
// rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::== { pkcs1-1 1 }
|
||
//
|
||
// id-dsa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::== { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
|
||
// x9-57(10040) x9cm(4) 1 }
|
||
oidPublicKeyRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 1}
|
||
oidPublicKeyDSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10040, 4, 1}
|
||
// RFC 5480, 2.1.1 Unrestricted Algorithm Identifier and Parameters
|
||
//
|
||
// id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
|
||
// iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
|
||
oidPublicKeyECDSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 2, 1}
|
||
// GB/T 33560-2017 信息安全技术 密码应用标识规范
|
||
// 附录A（规范性附录）商用密码领域中的相关OID定义
|
||
oidPublicKeySM2 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 156, 10197, 1, 301}
|
||
// RFC 8410, Section 3
|
||
//
|
||
// id-X25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 110 }
|
||
// id-Ed25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 112 }
|
||
oidPublicKeyX25519 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 101, 110}
|
||
oidPublicKeyEd25519 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 101, 112}
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
// getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID returns the exposed PublicKeyAlgorithm
|
||
// identifier for public key types supported in certificates and CSRs. Marshal
|
||
// and Parse functions may support a different set of public key types.
|
||
func getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) PublicKeyAlgorithm {
|
||
switch {
|
||
case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyRSA):
|
||
return RSA
|
||
case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyDSA):
|
||
return DSA
|
||
case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyECDSA):
|
||
return ECDSA
|
||
case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeySM2):
|
||
return ECDSA
|
||
case oid.Equal(oidPublicKeyEd25519):
|
||
return Ed25519
|
||
}
|
||
return UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// RFC 5480, 2.1.1.1. Named Curve
|
||
var (
|
||
oidNamedCurveP224 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 132, 0, 33}
|
||
oidNamedCurveP256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 3, 1, 7}
|
||
oidNamedCurveP384 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 132, 0, 34}
|
||
oidNamedCurveP521 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 132, 0, 35}
|
||
|
||
// GB/T 33560-2017 信息安全技术 密码应用标识规范
|
||
// 附录A（规范性附录）商用密码领域中的相关OID定义
|
||
//
|
||
// http://gmssl.org/docs/oid.html
|
||
oidNamedCurveP256SM2 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 156, 10197, 1, 301}
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
func namedCurveFromOID(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) elliptic.Curve {
|
||
switch {
|
||
case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP224):
|
||
return elliptic.P224()
|
||
case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP256):
|
||
return elliptic.P256()
|
||
case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP384):
|
||
return elliptic.P384()
|
||
case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP521):
|
||
return elliptic.P521()
|
||
case oid.Equal(oidNamedCurveP256SM2):
|
||
return sm2.P256()
|
||
}
|
||
return nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func oidFromNamedCurve(curve elliptic.Curve) (asn1.ObjectIdentifier, bool) {
|
||
switch curve {
|
||
case elliptic.P224():
|
||
return oidNamedCurveP224, true
|
||
case elliptic.P256():
|
||
return oidNamedCurveP256, true
|
||
case elliptic.P384():
|
||
return oidNamedCurveP384, true
|
||
case elliptic.P521():
|
||
return oidNamedCurveP521, true
|
||
case sm2.P256():
|
||
return oidNamedCurveP256SM2, true
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return nil, false
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func oidFromECDHCurve(curve ecdh.Curve) (asn1.ObjectIdentifier, bool) {
|
||
switch curve {
|
||
case ecdh.P256():
|
||
return oidNamedCurveP256SM2, true
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return nil, false
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// KeyUsage represents the set of actions that are valid for a given key. It's
|
||
// a bitmap of the KeyUsage* constants.
|
||
type KeyUsage = x509.KeyUsage
|
||
|
||
const (
|
||
KeyUsageDigitalSignature = x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature
|
||
KeyUsageContentCommitment = x509.KeyUsageContentCommitment
|
||
KeyUsageKeyEncipherment = x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment
|
||
KeyUsageDataEncipherment = x509.KeyUsageDataEncipherment
|
||
KeyUsageKeyAgreement = x509.KeyUsageKeyAgreement
|
||
KeyUsageCertSign = x509.KeyUsageCertSign
|
||
KeyUsageCRLSign = x509.KeyUsageCRLSign
|
||
KeyUsageEncipherOnly = x509.KeyUsageEncipherOnly
|
||
KeyUsageDecipherOnly = x509.KeyUsageDecipherOnly
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.12 Extended Key Usage
|
||
//
|
||
// anyExtendedKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-extKeyUsage 0 }
|
||
//
|
||
// id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 3 }
|
||
//
|
||
// id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 }
|
||
// id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 }
|
||
// id-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 3 }
|
||
// id-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 4 }
|
||
// id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 }
|
||
// id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
|
||
var (
|
||
oidExtKeyUsageAny = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 5, 29, 37, 0}
|
||
oidExtKeyUsageServerAuth = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 1}
|
||
oidExtKeyUsageClientAuth = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 2}
|
||
oidExtKeyUsageCodeSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 3}
|
||
oidExtKeyUsageEmailProtection = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 4}
|
||
oidExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 5}
|
||
oidExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 6}
|
||
oidExtKeyUsageIPSECUser = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 7}
|
||
oidExtKeyUsageTimeStamping = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 8}
|
||
oidExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3, 9}
|
||
oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 311, 10, 3, 3}
|
||
oidExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 113730, 4, 1}
|
||
oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftCommercialCodeSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 311, 2, 1, 22}
|
||
oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftKernelCodeSigning = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 311, 61, 1, 1}
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
// ExtKeyUsage represents an extended set of actions that are valid for a given key.
|
||
// Each of the ExtKeyUsage* constants define a unique action.
|
||
type ExtKeyUsage = x509.ExtKeyUsage
|
||
|
||
const (
|
||
ExtKeyUsageAny = x509.ExtKeyUsageAny
|
||
ExtKeyUsageServerAuth = x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth
|
||
ExtKeyUsageClientAuth = x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth
|
||
ExtKeyUsageCodeSigning = x509.ExtKeyUsageCodeSigning
|
||
ExtKeyUsageEmailProtection = x509.ExtKeyUsageEmailProtection
|
||
ExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem = x509.ExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem
|
||
ExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel = x509.ExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel
|
||
ExtKeyUsageIPSECUser = x509.ExtKeyUsageIPSECUser
|
||
ExtKeyUsageTimeStamping = x509.ExtKeyUsageTimeStamping
|
||
ExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning = x509.ExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning
|
||
ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto = x509.ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto
|
||
ExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto = x509.ExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto
|
||
ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftCommercialCodeSigning = x509.ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftCommercialCodeSigning
|
||
ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftKernelCodeSigning = x509.ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftKernelCodeSigning
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
// extKeyUsageOIDs contains the mapping between an ExtKeyUsage and its OID.
|
||
var extKeyUsageOIDs = []struct {
|
||
extKeyUsage ExtKeyUsage
|
||
oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier
|
||
}{
|
||
{ExtKeyUsageAny, oidExtKeyUsageAny},
|
||
{ExtKeyUsageServerAuth, oidExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
|
||
{ExtKeyUsageClientAuth, oidExtKeyUsageClientAuth},
|
||
{ExtKeyUsageCodeSigning, oidExtKeyUsageCodeSigning},
|
||
{ExtKeyUsageEmailProtection, oidExtKeyUsageEmailProtection},
|
||
{ExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem, oidExtKeyUsageIPSECEndSystem},
|
||
{ExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel, oidExtKeyUsageIPSECTunnel},
|
||
{ExtKeyUsageIPSECUser, oidExtKeyUsageIPSECUser},
|
||
{ExtKeyUsageTimeStamping, oidExtKeyUsageTimeStamping},
|
||
{ExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning, oidExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning},
|
||
{ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto, oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto},
|
||
{ExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto, oidExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto},
|
||
{ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftCommercialCodeSigning, oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftCommercialCodeSigning},
|
||
{ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftKernelCodeSigning, oidExtKeyUsageMicrosoftKernelCodeSigning},
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func extKeyUsageFromOID(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) (eku ExtKeyUsage, ok bool) {
|
||
for _, pair := range extKeyUsageOIDs {
|
||
if oid.Equal(pair.oid) {
|
||
return pair.extKeyUsage, true
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func oidFromExtKeyUsage(eku ExtKeyUsage) (oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier, ok bool) {
|
||
for _, pair := range extKeyUsageOIDs {
|
||
if eku == pair.extKeyUsage {
|
||
return pair.oid, true
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// debugAllowSHA1 allows SHA-1 signatures. See issue 41682.
|
||
var debugAllowSHA1 = godebug.Get("x509sha1") == "1"
|
||
|
||
// A Certificate represents an X.509 certificate.
|
||
type Certificate x509.Certificate
|
||
|
||
func (c *Certificate) asX509() *x509.Certificate {
|
||
return (*x509.Certificate)(c)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ToX509 convert smx509.Certificate reference to x509.Certificate
|
||
func (c *Certificate) ToX509() *x509.Certificate {
|
||
return c.asX509()
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (c *Certificate) Equal(other *Certificate) bool {
|
||
if c == nil || other == nil {
|
||
return c == other
|
||
}
|
||
return bytes.Equal(c.Raw, other.Raw)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (c *Certificate) hasSANExtension() bool {
|
||
return oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectAltName, c.Extensions)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// CheckSignatureFrom verifies that the signature on c is a valid signature from parent.
|
||
//
|
||
// This is a low-level API that performs very limited checks, and not a full
|
||
// path verifier. Most users should use [Certificate.Verify] instead.
|
||
func (c *Certificate) CheckSignatureFrom(parent *Certificate) error {
|
||
// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.9:
|
||
// "If the basic constraints extension is not present in a version 3
|
||
// certificate, or the extension is present but the cA boolean is not
|
||
// asserted, then the certified public key MUST NOT be used to verify
|
||
// certificate signatures."
|
||
if parent.Version == 3 && !parent.BasicConstraintsValid ||
|
||
parent.BasicConstraintsValid && !parent.IsCA {
|
||
return x509.ConstraintViolationError{}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if parent.KeyUsage != 0 && parent.KeyUsage&KeyUsageCertSign == 0 {
|
||
return x509.ConstraintViolationError{}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if parent.PublicKeyAlgorithm == UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm {
|
||
return x509.ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// TODO(agl): don't ignore the path length constraint.
|
||
|
||
return checkSignature(c.SignatureAlgorithm, c.RawTBSCertificate, c.Signature, parent.PublicKey, debugAllowSHA1)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// CheckSignature verifies that signature is a valid signature over signed from
|
||
// c's public key.
|
||
//
|
||
// This is a low-level API that performs no validity checks on the certificate.
|
||
//
|
||
// [MD5WithRSA] signatures are rejected, while [SHA1WithRSA] and [ECDSAWithSHA1]
|
||
// signatures are currently accepted.
|
||
func (c *Certificate) CheckSignature(algo SignatureAlgorithm, signed, signature []byte) error {
|
||
return checkSignature(algo, signed, signature, c.PublicKey, true)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (c *Certificate) hasNameConstraints() bool {
|
||
return oidInExtensions(oidExtensionNameConstraints, c.Extensions)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (c *Certificate) getSANExtension() []byte {
|
||
for _, e := range c.Extensions {
|
||
if e.Id.Equal(oidExtensionSubjectAltName) {
|
||
return e.Value
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
return nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func signaturePublicKeyAlgoMismatchError(expectedPubKeyAlgo PublicKeyAlgorithm, pubKey any) error {
|
||
return fmt.Errorf("x509: signature algorithm specifies an %s public key, but have public key of type %T", expectedPubKeyAlgo.String(), pubKey)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// checkSignature verifies that signature is a valid signature over signed from
|
||
// a crypto.PublicKey.
|
||
func checkSignature(algo SignatureAlgorithm, signed, signature []byte, publicKey crypto.PublicKey, allowSHA1 bool) (err error) {
|
||
var hashType crypto.Hash
|
||
var pubKeyAlgo PublicKeyAlgorithm
|
||
|
||
isSM2 := (algo == SM2WithSM3)
|
||
for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails {
|
||
if details.algo == algo {
|
||
hashType = details.hash
|
||
pubKeyAlgo = details.pubKeyAlgo
|
||
break
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
switch hashType {
|
||
case crypto.Hash(0):
|
||
if !isSM2 && pubKeyAlgo != Ed25519 {
|
||
return x509.ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm
|
||
}
|
||
case crypto.MD5:
|
||
return x509.InsecureAlgorithmError(algo)
|
||
case crypto.SHA1:
|
||
// SHA-1 signatures are mostly disabled. See go.dev/issue/41682.
|
||
if !allowSHA1 {
|
||
return x509.InsecureAlgorithmError(algo)
|
||
}
|
||
fallthrough
|
||
default:
|
||
if !hashType.Available() {
|
||
return x509.ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm
|
||
}
|
||
h := hashType.New()
|
||
h.Write(signed)
|
||
signed = h.Sum(nil)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
switch pub := publicKey.(type) {
|
||
case *rsa.PublicKey:
|
||
if pubKeyAlgo != RSA {
|
||
return signaturePublicKeyAlgoMismatchError(pubKeyAlgo, pub)
|
||
}
|
||
if isRSAPSS(algo) {
|
||
return rsa.VerifyPSS(pub, hashType, signed, signature, &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash})
|
||
} else {
|
||
return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pub, hashType, signed, signature)
|
||
}
|
||
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
|
||
if pubKeyAlgo != ECDSA {
|
||
return signaturePublicKeyAlgoMismatchError(pubKeyAlgo, pub)
|
||
}
|
||
if isSM2 {
|
||
if !sm2.VerifyASN1WithSM2(pub, nil, signed, signature) {
|
||
return errors.New("x509: SM2 verification failure")
|
||
}
|
||
} else if !ecdsa.VerifyASN1(pub, signed, signature) {
|
||
return errors.New("x509: ECDSA verification failure")
|
||
}
|
||
return
|
||
case ed25519.PublicKey:
|
||
if pubKeyAlgo != Ed25519 {
|
||
return signaturePublicKeyAlgoMismatchError(pubKeyAlgo, pub)
|
||
}
|
||
if !ed25519.Verify(pub, signed, signature) {
|
||
return errors.New("x509: Ed25519 verification failure")
|
||
}
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
return x509.ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// CheckCRLSignature checks that the signature in crl is from c.
|
||
func (c *Certificate) CheckCRLSignature(crl *pkix.CertificateList) error {
|
||
algo := getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(crl.SignatureAlgorithm)
|
||
return c.CheckSignature(algo, crl.TBSCertList.Raw, crl.SignatureValue.RightAlign())
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
type basicConstraints struct {
|
||
IsCA bool `asn1:"optional"`
|
||
MaxPathLen int `asn1:"optional,default:-1"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// RFC 5280 4.2.1.4
|
||
type policyInformation struct {
|
||
Policy asn1.ObjectIdentifier
|
||
// policyQualifiers omitted
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
const (
|
||
nameTypeEmail = 1
|
||
nameTypeDNS = 2
|
||
nameTypeURI = 6
|
||
nameTypeIP = 7
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
// RFC 5280, 4.2.2.1
|
||
type authorityInfoAccess struct {
|
||
Method asn1.ObjectIdentifier
|
||
Location asn1.RawValue
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.14
|
||
type distributionPoint struct {
|
||
DistributionPoint distributionPointName `asn1:"optional,tag:0"`
|
||
Reason asn1.BitString `asn1:"optional,tag:1"`
|
||
CRLIssuer asn1.RawValue `asn1:"optional,tag:2"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
type distributionPointName struct {
|
||
FullName []asn1.RawValue `asn1:"optional,tag:0"`
|
||
RelativeName pkix.RDNSequence `asn1:"optional,tag:1"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func reverseBitsInAByte(in byte) byte {
|
||
b1 := in>>4 | in<<4
|
||
b2 := b1>>2&0x33 | b1<<2&0xcc
|
||
b3 := b2>>1&0x55 | b2<<1&0xaa
|
||
return b3
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// asn1BitLength returns the bit-length of bitString by considering the
|
||
// most-significant bit in a byte to be the "first" bit. This convention
|
||
// matches ASN.1, but differs from almost everything else.
|
||
func asn1BitLength(bitString []byte) int {
|
||
bitLen := len(bitString) * 8
|
||
|
||
for i := range bitString {
|
||
b := bitString[len(bitString)-i-1]
|
||
|
||
for bit := uint(0); bit < 8; bit++ {
|
||
if (b>>bit)&1 == 1 {
|
||
return bitLen
|
||
}
|
||
bitLen--
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return 0
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
var (
|
||
oidExtensionSubjectKeyId = []int{2, 5, 29, 14}
|
||
oidExtensionKeyUsage = []int{2, 5, 29, 15}
|
||
oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage = []int{2, 5, 29, 37}
|
||
oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId = []int{2, 5, 29, 35}
|
||
oidExtensionBasicConstraints = []int{2, 5, 29, 19}
|
||
oidExtensionSubjectAltName = []int{2, 5, 29, 17}
|
||
oidExtensionCertificatePolicies = []int{2, 5, 29, 32}
|
||
oidExtensionNameConstraints = []int{2, 5, 29, 30}
|
||
oidExtensionCRLDistributionPoints = []int{2, 5, 29, 31}
|
||
oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess = []int{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 1, 1}
|
||
oidExtensionCRLNumber = []int{2, 5, 29, 20}
|
||
oidExtensionReasonCode = []int{2, 5, 29, 21}
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
var (
|
||
oidAuthorityInfoAccessOcsp = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 1}
|
||
oidAuthorityInfoAccessIssuers = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 2}
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
// oidNotInExtensions reports whether an extension with the given oid exists in
|
||
// extensions.
|
||
func oidInExtensions(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier, extensions []pkix.Extension) bool {
|
||
for _, e := range extensions {
|
||
if e.Id.Equal(oid) {
|
||
return true
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
return false
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// marshalSANs marshals a list of addresses into a the contents of an X.509
|
||
// SubjectAlternativeName extension.
|
||
func marshalSANs(dnsNames, emailAddresses []string, ipAddresses []net.IP, uris []*url.URL) (derBytes []byte, err error) {
|
||
var rawValues []asn1.RawValue
|
||
for _, name := range dnsNames {
|
||
if err := isIA5String(name); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeDNS, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)})
|
||
}
|
||
for _, email := range emailAddresses {
|
||
if err := isIA5String(email); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeEmail, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(email)})
|
||
}
|
||
for _, rawIP := range ipAddresses {
|
||
// If possible, we always want to encode IPv4 addresses in 4 bytes.
|
||
ip := rawIP.To4()
|
||
if ip == nil {
|
||
ip = rawIP
|
||
}
|
||
rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeIP, Class: 2, Bytes: ip})
|
||
}
|
||
for _, uri := range uris {
|
||
uriStr := uri.String()
|
||
if err := isIA5String(uriStr); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeURI, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(uriStr)})
|
||
}
|
||
return asn1.Marshal(rawValues)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func isIA5String(s string) error {
|
||
for _, r := range s {
|
||
// Per RFC5280 "IA5String is limited to the set of ASCII characters"
|
||
if r >= unicode.MaxASCII {
|
||
return fmt.Errorf("x509: %q cannot be encoded as an IA5String", s)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func buildCertExtensions(template *x509.Certificate, subjectIsEmpty bool, authorityKeyId, subjectKeyId []byte) (ret []pkix.Extension, err error) {
|
||
ret = make([]pkix.Extension, 10 /* maximum number of elements. */)
|
||
n := 0
|
||
|
||
if template.KeyUsage != 0 &&
|
||
!oidInExtensions(oidExtensionKeyUsage, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
||
ret[n], err = marshalKeyUsage(template.KeyUsage)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
n++
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (len(template.ExtKeyUsage) > 0 || len(template.UnknownExtKeyUsage) > 0) &&
|
||
!oidInExtensions(oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
||
ret[n], err = marshalExtKeyUsage(template.ExtKeyUsage, template.UnknownExtKeyUsage)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
n++
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if template.BasicConstraintsValid && !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionBasicConstraints, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
||
ret[n], err = marshalBasicConstraints(template.IsCA, template.MaxPathLen, template.MaxPathLenZero)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
n++
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if len(subjectKeyId) > 0 && !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectKeyId, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
||
ret[n].Id = oidExtensionSubjectKeyId
|
||
ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(subjectKeyId)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
n++
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if len(authorityKeyId) > 0 && !oidInExtensions(oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
||
ret[n].Id = oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId
|
||
ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(authKeyId{authorityKeyId})
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
n++
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (len(template.OCSPServer) > 0 || len(template.IssuingCertificateURL) > 0) &&
|
||
!oidInExtensions(oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
||
ret[n].Id = oidExtensionAuthorityInfoAccess
|
||
var aiaValues []authorityInfoAccess
|
||
for _, name := range template.OCSPServer {
|
||
aiaValues = append(aiaValues, authorityInfoAccess{
|
||
Method: oidAuthorityInfoAccessOcsp,
|
||
Location: asn1.RawValue{Tag: 6, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)},
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
for _, name := range template.IssuingCertificateURL {
|
||
aiaValues = append(aiaValues, authorityInfoAccess{
|
||
Method: oidAuthorityInfoAccessIssuers,
|
||
Location: asn1.RawValue{Tag: 6, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)},
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(aiaValues)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
n++
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (len(template.DNSNames) > 0 || len(template.EmailAddresses) > 0 || len(template.IPAddresses) > 0 || len(template.URIs) > 0) &&
|
||
!oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectAltName, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
||
ret[n].Id = oidExtensionSubjectAltName
|
||
// From RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.6:
|
||
// “If the subject field contains an empty sequence ... then
|
||
// subjectAltName extension ... is marked as critical”
|
||
ret[n].Critical = subjectIsEmpty
|
||
ret[n].Value, err = marshalSANs(template.DNSNames, template.EmailAddresses, template.IPAddresses, template.URIs)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
n++
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if len(template.PolicyIdentifiers) > 0 &&
|
||
!oidInExtensions(oidExtensionCertificatePolicies, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
||
ret[n], err = marshalCertificatePolicies(template.PolicyIdentifiers)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
n++
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (len(template.PermittedDNSDomains) > 0 || len(template.ExcludedDNSDomains) > 0 ||
|
||
len(template.PermittedIPRanges) > 0 || len(template.ExcludedIPRanges) > 0 ||
|
||
len(template.PermittedEmailAddresses) > 0 || len(template.ExcludedEmailAddresses) > 0 ||
|
||
len(template.PermittedURIDomains) > 0 || len(template.ExcludedURIDomains) > 0) &&
|
||
!oidInExtensions(oidExtensionNameConstraints, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
||
ret[n].Id = oidExtensionNameConstraints
|
||
ret[n].Critical = template.PermittedDNSDomainsCritical
|
||
|
||
ipAndMask := func(ipNet *net.IPNet) []byte {
|
||
maskedIP := ipNet.IP.Mask(ipNet.Mask)
|
||
ipAndMask := make([]byte, 0, len(maskedIP)+len(ipNet.Mask))
|
||
ipAndMask = append(ipAndMask, maskedIP...)
|
||
ipAndMask = append(ipAndMask, ipNet.Mask...)
|
||
return ipAndMask
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
serialiseConstraints := func(dns []string, ips []*net.IPNet, emails []string, uriDomains []string) (der []byte, err error) {
|
||
var b cryptobyte.Builder
|
||
|
||
for _, name := range dns {
|
||
if err = isIA5String(name); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
||
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(2).ContextSpecific(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
||
b.AddBytes([]byte(name))
|
||
})
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
for _, ipNet := range ips {
|
||
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
||
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(7).ContextSpecific(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
||
b.AddBytes(ipAndMask(ipNet))
|
||
})
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
for _, email := range emails {
|
||
if err = isIA5String(email); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
||
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(1).ContextSpecific(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
||
b.AddBytes([]byte(email))
|
||
})
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
for _, uriDomain := range uriDomains {
|
||
if err = isIA5String(uriDomain); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
||
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(6).ContextSpecific(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
||
b.AddBytes([]byte(uriDomain))
|
||
})
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return b.Bytes()
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
permitted, err := serialiseConstraints(template.PermittedDNSDomains, template.PermittedIPRanges, template.PermittedEmailAddresses, template.PermittedURIDomains)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
excluded, err := serialiseConstraints(template.ExcludedDNSDomains, template.ExcludedIPRanges, template.ExcludedEmailAddresses, template.ExcludedURIDomains)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
var b cryptobyte.Builder
|
||
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
||
if len(permitted) > 0 {
|
||
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(0).ContextSpecific().Constructed(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
||
b.AddBytes(permitted)
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if len(excluded) > 0 {
|
||
b.AddASN1(cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(1).ContextSpecific().Constructed(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
||
b.AddBytes(excluded)
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
})
|
||
|
||
ret[n].Value, err = b.Bytes()
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
n++
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if len(template.CRLDistributionPoints) > 0 &&
|
||
!oidInExtensions(oidExtensionCRLDistributionPoints, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
||
ret[n].Id = oidExtensionCRLDistributionPoints
|
||
|
||
var crlDp []distributionPoint
|
||
for _, name := range template.CRLDistributionPoints {
|
||
dp := distributionPoint{
|
||
DistributionPoint: distributionPointName{
|
||
FullName: []asn1.RawValue{
|
||
{Tag: 6, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)},
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
crlDp = append(crlDp, dp)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ret[n].Value, err = asn1.Marshal(crlDp)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
n++
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Adding another extension here? Remember to update the maximum number
|
||
// of elements in the make() at the top of the function and the list of
|
||
// template fields used in CreateCertificate documentation.
|
||
|
||
return append(ret[:n], template.ExtraExtensions...), nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func marshalKeyUsage(ku KeyUsage) (pkix.Extension, error) {
|
||
ext := pkix.Extension{Id: oidExtensionKeyUsage, Critical: true}
|
||
|
||
var a [2]byte
|
||
a[0] = reverseBitsInAByte(byte(ku))
|
||
a[1] = reverseBitsInAByte(byte(ku >> 8))
|
||
|
||
l := 1
|
||
if a[1] != 0 {
|
||
l = 2
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
bitString := a[:l]
|
||
var err error
|
||
ext.Value, err = asn1.Marshal(asn1.BitString{Bytes: bitString, BitLength: asn1BitLength(bitString)})
|
||
return ext, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func marshalExtKeyUsage(extUsages []ExtKeyUsage, unknownUsages []asn1.ObjectIdentifier) (pkix.Extension, error) {
|
||
ext := pkix.Extension{Id: oidExtensionExtendedKeyUsage}
|
||
|
||
oids := make([]asn1.ObjectIdentifier, len(extUsages)+len(unknownUsages))
|
||
for i, u := range extUsages {
|
||
if oid, ok := oidFromExtKeyUsage(u); ok {
|
||
oids[i] = oid
|
||
} else {
|
||
return ext, errors.New("x509: unknown extended key usage")
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
copy(oids[len(extUsages):], unknownUsages)
|
||
|
||
var err error
|
||
ext.Value, err = asn1.Marshal(oids)
|
||
return ext, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func marshalBasicConstraints(isCA bool, maxPathLen int, maxPathLenZero bool) (pkix.Extension, error) {
|
||
ext := pkix.Extension{Id: oidExtensionBasicConstraints, Critical: true}
|
||
// Leaving MaxPathLen as zero indicates that no maximum path
|
||
// length is desired, unless MaxPathLenZero is set. A value of
|
||
// -1 causes encoding/asn1 to omit the value as desired.
|
||
if maxPathLen == 0 && !maxPathLenZero {
|
||
maxPathLen = -1
|
||
}
|
||
var err error
|
||
ext.Value, err = asn1.Marshal(basicConstraints{isCA, maxPathLen})
|
||
return ext, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func marshalCertificatePolicies(policyIdentifiers []asn1.ObjectIdentifier) (pkix.Extension, error) {
|
||
ext := pkix.Extension{Id: oidExtensionCertificatePolicies}
|
||
policies := make([]policyInformation, len(policyIdentifiers))
|
||
for i, policy := range policyIdentifiers {
|
||
policies[i].Policy = policy
|
||
}
|
||
var err error
|
||
ext.Value, err = asn1.Marshal(policies)
|
||
return ext, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func buildCSRExtensions(template *x509.CertificateRequest) ([]pkix.Extension, error) {
|
||
var ret []pkix.Extension
|
||
|
||
if (len(template.DNSNames) > 0 || len(template.EmailAddresses) > 0 || len(template.IPAddresses) > 0 || len(template.URIs) > 0) &&
|
||
!oidInExtensions(oidExtensionSubjectAltName, template.ExtraExtensions) {
|
||
sanBytes, err := marshalSANs(template.DNSNames, template.EmailAddresses, template.IPAddresses, template.URIs)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ret = append(ret, pkix.Extension{
|
||
Id: oidExtensionSubjectAltName,
|
||
Value: sanBytes,
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return append(ret, template.ExtraExtensions...), nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func subjectBytes(cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, error) {
|
||
if len(cert.RawSubject) > 0 {
|
||
return cert.RawSubject, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return asn1.Marshal(cert.Subject.ToRDNSequence())
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// signingParamsForKey returns the signature algorithm and its Algorithm
|
||
// Identifier to use for signing, based on the key type. If sigAlgo is not zero
|
||
// then it overrides the default.
|
||
func signingParamsForKey(key crypto.Signer, sigAlgo SignatureAlgorithm) (SignatureAlgorithm, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier, error) {
|
||
var ai pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
|
||
var pubType PublicKeyAlgorithm
|
||
var defaultAlgo SignatureAlgorithm
|
||
|
||
switch pub := key.Public().(type) {
|
||
case *rsa.PublicKey:
|
||
pubType = RSA
|
||
defaultAlgo = SHA256WithRSA
|
||
|
||
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
|
||
pubType = ECDSA
|
||
switch pub.Curve {
|
||
case elliptic.P224(), elliptic.P256():
|
||
defaultAlgo = ECDSAWithSHA256
|
||
case elliptic.P384():
|
||
defaultAlgo = ECDSAWithSHA384
|
||
case elliptic.P521():
|
||
defaultAlgo = ECDSAWithSHA512
|
||
case sm2.P256():
|
||
defaultAlgo = SM2WithSM3
|
||
default:
|
||
return 0, ai, errors.New("x509: unsupported elliptic curve")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
case ed25519.PublicKey:
|
||
pubType = Ed25519
|
||
defaultAlgo = PureEd25519
|
||
|
||
default:
|
||
return 0, ai, errors.New("x509: only RSA, ECDSA and Ed25519 keys supported")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if sigAlgo == 0 {
|
||
sigAlgo = defaultAlgo
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails {
|
||
if details.algo == sigAlgo {
|
||
if details.pubKeyAlgo != pubType || (sigAlgo != defaultAlgo && defaultAlgo == SM2WithSM3) {
|
||
return 0, ai, errors.New("x509: requested SignatureAlgorithm does not match private key type")
|
||
}
|
||
if details.hash == crypto.MD5 {
|
||
return 0, ai, errors.New("x509: signing with MD5 is not supported")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return sigAlgo, pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{
|
||
Algorithm: details.oid,
|
||
Parameters: details.params,
|
||
}, nil
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return 0, ai, errors.New("x509: unknown SignatureAlgorithm")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func signTBS(tbs []byte, key crypto.Signer, sigAlg SignatureAlgorithm, rand io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
|
||
signed := tbs
|
||
hashFunc := hashFunc(sigAlg)
|
||
if hashFunc != 0 {
|
||
h := hashFunc.New()
|
||
h.Write(signed)
|
||
signed = h.Sum(nil)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
var signerOpts crypto.SignerOpts = hashFunc
|
||
if isRSAPSS(sigAlg) {
|
||
signerOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{
|
||
SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash,
|
||
Hash: hashFunc,
|
||
}
|
||
} else if sigAlg == SM2WithSM3 {
|
||
signerOpts = sm2.DefaultSM2SignerOpts
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
signature, err := key.Sign(rand, signed, signerOpts)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Check the signature to ensure the crypto.Signer behaved correctly.
|
||
if err := checkSignature(sigAlg, tbs, signature, key.Public(), true); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: signature returned by signer is invalid: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return signature, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// emptyASN1Subject is the ASN.1 DER encoding of an empty Subject, which is
|
||
// just an empty SEQUENCE.
|
||
var emptyASN1Subject = []byte{0x30, 0}
|
||
|
||
// CreateCertificate creates a new X.509 v3 certificate based on a template.
|
||
// The following members of template are currently used:
|
||
//
|
||
// - AuthorityKeyId
|
||
// - BasicConstraintsValid
|
||
// - CRLDistributionPoints
|
||
// - DNSNames
|
||
// - EmailAddresses
|
||
// - ExcludedDNSDomains
|
||
// - ExcludedEmailAddresses
|
||
// - ExcludedIPRanges
|
||
// - ExcludedURIDomains
|
||
// - ExtKeyUsage
|
||
// - ExtraExtensions
|
||
// - IPAddresses
|
||
// - IsCA
|
||
// - IssuingCertificateURL
|
||
// - KeyUsage
|
||
// - MaxPathLen
|
||
// - MaxPathLenZero
|
||
// - NotAfter
|
||
// - NotBefore
|
||
// - OCSPServer
|
||
// - PermittedDNSDomains
|
||
// - PermittedDNSDomainsCritical
|
||
// - PermittedEmailAddresses
|
||
// - PermittedIPRanges
|
||
// - PermittedURIDomains
|
||
// - PolicyIdentifiers
|
||
// - SerialNumber
|
||
// - SignatureAlgorithm
|
||
// - Subject
|
||
// - SubjectKeyId
|
||
// - URIs
|
||
// - UnknownExtKeyUsage
|
||
//
|
||
// The certificate is signed by parent. If parent is equal to template then the
|
||
// certificate is self-signed, both parent and template should be *x509.Certificate or
|
||
// *smx509.Certificate type. The parameter pub is the public key of the certificate to
|
||
// be generated and priv is the private key of the signer.
|
||
//
|
||
// The returned slice is the certificate in DER encoding.
|
||
//
|
||
// The currently supported key types are *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey and
|
||
// ed25519.PublicKey. pub must be a supported key type, and priv must be a
|
||
// crypto.Signer with a supported public key.
|
||
//
|
||
// The AuthorityKeyId will be taken from the SubjectKeyId of parent, if any,
|
||
// unless the resulting certificate is self-signed. Otherwise the value from
|
||
// template will be used.
|
||
//
|
||
// If SubjectKeyId from template is empty and the template is a CA, SubjectKeyId
|
||
// will be generated from the hash of the public key.
|
||
//
|
||
// If template.SerialNumber is nil, a serial number will be generated which
|
||
// conforms to RFC 5280, Section 4.1.2.2 using entropy from rand.
|
||
//
|
||
func CreateCertificate(rand io.Reader, template, parent, pub, priv any) ([]byte, error) {
|
||
realTemplate, err := toCertificate(template)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: unsupported template parameter type: %T", template)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
realParent, err := toCertificate(parent)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: unsupported parent parameter type: %T", parent)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
key, ok := priv.(crypto.Signer)
|
||
if !ok {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("x509: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Signer")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
serialNumber := realTemplate.SerialNumber
|
||
if serialNumber == nil {
|
||
// Generate a serial number following RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.2 if one is not provided.
|
||
// Requirements:
|
||
// - serial number must be positive
|
||
// - at most 20 octets when encoded
|
||
maxSerial := big.NewInt(1).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 20*8)
|
||
for {
|
||
var err error
|
||
serialNumber, err = cryptorand.Int(rand, maxSerial)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
// If the serial is exactly 20 octets, check if the high bit of the first byte is set.
|
||
// If so, generate a new serial, since it will be padded with a leading 0 byte during
|
||
// encoding so that the serial is not interpreted as a negative integer, making it
|
||
// 21 octets.
|
||
if serialBytes := serialNumber.Bytes(); len(serialBytes) > 0 && (len(serialBytes) < 20 || serialBytes[0]&0x80 == 0) {
|
||
break
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.2: serial number must positive
|
||
|
||
// We _should_ also restrict serials to <= 20 octets, but it turns out a lot of people
|
||
// get this wrong, in part because the encoding can itself alter the length of the
|
||
// serial. For now we accept these non-conformant serials.
|
||
if serialNumber.Sign() == -1 {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("x509: serial number must be positive")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if realTemplate.BasicConstraintsValid && !realTemplate.IsCA && realTemplate.MaxPathLen != -1 && (realTemplate.MaxPathLen != 0 || realTemplate.MaxPathLenZero) {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("x509: only CAs are allowed to specify MaxPathLen")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
signatureAlgorithm, algorithmIdentifier, err := signingParamsForKey(key, realTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, err := marshalPublicKey(pub)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(publicKeyAlgorithm.Algorithm) == UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm {
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("x509: unsupported public key type: %T", pub)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
asn1Issuer, err := subjectBytes(realParent)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
asn1Subject, err := subjectBytes(realTemplate)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
authorityKeyId := realTemplate.AuthorityKeyId
|
||
if !bytes.Equal(asn1Issuer, asn1Subject) && len(realParent.SubjectKeyId) > 0 {
|
||
authorityKeyId = realParent.SubjectKeyId
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
subjectKeyId := realTemplate.SubjectKeyId
|
||
if len(subjectKeyId) == 0 && realTemplate.IsCA {
|
||
// SubjectKeyId generated using method 1 in RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.2:
|
||
// (1) The keyIdentifier is composed of the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the
|
||
// value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey (excluding the tag,
|
||
// length, and number of unused bits).
|
||
h := sha1.Sum(publicKeyBytes)
|
||
subjectKeyId = h[:]
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Check that the signer's public key matches the private key, if available.
|
||
type privateKey interface {
|
||
Equal(crypto.PublicKey) bool
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if privPub, ok := key.Public().(privateKey); !ok {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("x509: internal error: supported public key does not implement Equal")
|
||
} else if realParent.PublicKey != nil && !privPub.Equal(realParent.PublicKey) {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("x509: provided PrivateKey doesn't match parent's PublicKey")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
extensions, err := buildCertExtensions(realTemplate, bytes.Equal(asn1Subject, emptyASN1Subject), authorityKeyId, subjectKeyId)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
encodedPublicKey := asn1.BitString{BitLength: len(publicKeyBytes) * 8, Bytes: publicKeyBytes}
|
||
c := tbsCertificate{
|
||
Version: 2,
|
||
SerialNumber: serialNumber,
|
||
SignatureAlgorithm: algorithmIdentifier,
|
||
Issuer: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: asn1Issuer},
|
||
Validity: validity{realTemplate.NotBefore.UTC(), realTemplate.NotAfter.UTC()},
|
||
Subject: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: asn1Subject},
|
||
PublicKey: publicKeyInfo{nil, publicKeyAlgorithm, encodedPublicKey},
|
||
Extensions: extensions,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
tbsCertContents, err := asn1.Marshal(c)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
c.Raw = tbsCertContents
|
||
|
||
signature, err := signTBS(tbsCertContents, key, signatureAlgorithm, rand)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
return asn1.Marshal(certificate{
|
||
TBSCertificate: c,
|
||
SignatureAlgorithm: algorithmIdentifier,
|
||
SignatureValue: asn1.BitString{Bytes: signature, BitLength: len(signature) * 8},
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func toCertificate(in any) (*x509.Certificate, error) {
|
||
switch c := in.(type) {
|
||
case *x509.Certificate:
|
||
return c, nil
|
||
case *Certificate:
|
||
return c.asX509(), nil
|
||
default:
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported certificate of type %T", in)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ParseCRL parses a CRL from the given bytes. It's often the case that PEM
|
||
// encoded CRLs will appear where they should be DER encoded, so this function
|
||
// will transparently handle PEM encoding as long as there isn't any leading
|
||
// garbage.
|
||
func ParseCRL(crlBytes []byte) (*pkix.CertificateList, error) {
|
||
return x509.ParseCRL(crlBytes)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ParseDERCRL parses a DER encoded CRL from the given bytes.
|
||
func ParseDERCRL(derBytes []byte) (*pkix.CertificateList, error) {
|
||
return x509.ParseDERCRL(derBytes)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// CreateCRL returns a DER encoded CRL, signed by this Certificate, that
|
||
// contains the given list of revoked certificates.
|
||
//
|
||
// Note: this method does not generate an RFC 5280 conformant X.509 v2 CRL.
|
||
// To generate a standards compliant CRL, use CreateRevocationList instead.
|
||
func (c *Certificate) CreateCRL(rand io.Reader, priv any, revokedCerts []pkix.RevokedCertificate, now, expiry time.Time) (crlBytes []byte, err error) {
|
||
key, ok := priv.(crypto.Signer)
|
||
if !ok {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("x509: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Signer")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
signatureAlgorithm, algorithmIdentifier, err := signingParamsForKey(key, 0)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Force revocation times to UTC per RFC 5280.
|
||
revokedCertsUTC := make([]pkix.RevokedCertificate, len(revokedCerts))
|
||
for i, rc := range revokedCerts {
|
||
rc.RevocationTime = rc.RevocationTime.UTC()
|
||
revokedCertsUTC[i] = rc
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
tbsCertList := pkix.TBSCertificateList{
|
||
Version: 1,
|
||
Signature: algorithmIdentifier,
|
||
Issuer: c.Subject.ToRDNSequence(),
|
||
ThisUpdate: now.UTC(),
|
||
NextUpdate: expiry.UTC(),
|
||
RevokedCertificates: revokedCertsUTC,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Authority Key Id
|
||
if len(c.SubjectKeyId) > 0 {
|
||
var aki pkix.Extension
|
||
aki.Id = oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId
|
||
aki.Value, err = asn1.Marshal(authKeyId{Id: c.SubjectKeyId})
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
tbsCertList.Extensions = append(tbsCertList.Extensions, aki)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
tbsCertListContents, err := asn1.Marshal(tbsCertList)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
tbsCertList.Raw = tbsCertListContents
|
||
signature, err := signTBS(tbsCertListContents, key, signatureAlgorithm, rand)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return asn1.Marshal(pkix.CertificateList{
|
||
TBSCertList: tbsCertList,
|
||
SignatureAlgorithm: algorithmIdentifier,
|
||
SignatureValue: asn1.BitString{Bytes: signature, BitLength: len(signature) * 8},
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// CertificateRequest represents a PKCS #10, certificate signature request.
|
||
type CertificateRequest x509.CertificateRequest
|
||
|
||
func (c *CertificateRequest) asX509() *x509.CertificateRequest {
|
||
return (*x509.CertificateRequest)(c)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ToX509 convert smx509.CertificateRequest reference to x509.CertificateRequest
|
||
func (c *CertificateRequest) ToX509() *x509.CertificateRequest {
|
||
return c.asX509()
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// These structures reflect the ASN.1 structure of X.509 certificate
|
||
// signature requests (see RFC 2986):
|
||
|
||
type tbsCertificateRequest struct {
|
||
Raw asn1.RawContent
|
||
Version int
|
||
Subject asn1.RawValue
|
||
PublicKey publicKeyInfo
|
||
RawAttributes []asn1.RawValue `asn1:"tag:0"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
type certificateRequest struct {
|
||
Raw asn1.RawContent
|
||
TBSCSR tbsCertificateRequest
|
||
SignatureAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
|
||
SignatureValue asn1.BitString
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// oidExtensionRequest is a PKCS #9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER that indicates requested
|
||
// extensions in a CSR.
|
||
var oidExtensionRequest = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 9, 14}
|
||
|
||
// newRawAttributes converts AttributeTypeAndValueSETs from a template
|
||
// CertificateRequest's Attributes into tbsCertificateRequest RawAttributes.
|
||
func newRawAttributes(attributes []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET) ([]asn1.RawValue, error) {
|
||
var rawAttributes []asn1.RawValue
|
||
b, err := asn1.Marshal(attributes)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(b, &rawAttributes)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
if len(rest) != 0 {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to unmarshal raw CSR Attributes")
|
||
}
|
||
return rawAttributes, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// parseRawAttributes Unmarshals RawAttributes into AttributeTypeAndValueSETs.
|
||
func parseRawAttributes(rawAttributes []asn1.RawValue) []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET {
|
||
var attributes []pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET
|
||
for _, rawAttr := range rawAttributes {
|
||
var attr pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET
|
||
rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(rawAttr.FullBytes, &attr)
|
||
// Ignore attributes that don't parse into pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET
|
||
// (i.e.: challengePassword or unstructuredName).
|
||
if err == nil && len(rest) == 0 {
|
||
attributes = append(attributes, attr)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
return attributes
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// parseCSRExtensions parses the attributes from a CSR and extracts any
|
||
// requested extensions.
|
||
func parseCSRExtensions(rawAttributes []asn1.RawValue) ([]pkix.Extension, error) {
|
||
// pkcs10Attribute reflects the Attribute structure from RFC 2986, Section 4.1.
|
||
type pkcs10Attribute struct {
|
||
Id asn1.ObjectIdentifier
|
||
Values []asn1.RawValue `asn1:"set"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
var ret []pkix.Extension
|
||
requestedExts := make(map[string]bool)
|
||
for _, rawAttr := range rawAttributes {
|
||
var attr pkcs10Attribute
|
||
if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(rawAttr.FullBytes, &attr); err != nil || len(rest) != 0 || len(attr.Values) == 0 {
|
||
// Ignore attributes that don't parse.
|
||
continue
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if !attr.Id.Equal(oidExtensionRequest) {
|
||
continue
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
var extensions []pkix.Extension
|
||
if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(attr.Values[0].FullBytes, &extensions); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
for _, ext := range extensions {
|
||
oidStr := ext.Id.String()
|
||
if requestedExts[oidStr] {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("x509: certificate request contains duplicate requested extensions")
|
||
}
|
||
requestedExts[oidStr] = true
|
||
}
|
||
ret = append(ret, extensions...)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return ret, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// CreateCertificateRequest creates a new certificate request based on a
|
||
// template. The following members of template are used:
|
||
//
|
||
// - SignatureAlgorithm
|
||
// - Subject
|
||
// - DNSNames
|
||
// - EmailAddresses
|
||
// - IPAddresses
|
||
// - URIs
|
||
// - ExtraExtensions
|
||
// - Attributes (deprecated)
|
||
//
|
||
// priv is the private key to sign the CSR with, and the corresponding public
|
||
// key will be included in the CSR. It must implement crypto.Signer and its
|
||
// Public() method must return a *rsa.PublicKey or a *ecdsa.PublicKey or a
|
||
// ed25519.PublicKey. (A *rsa.PrivateKey, *ecdsa.PrivateKey or
|
||
// ed25519.PrivateKey satisfies this.)
|
||
//
|
||
// The returned slice is the certificate request in DER encoding.
|
||
func CreateCertificateRequest(rand io.Reader, template *x509.CertificateRequest, priv any) (csr []byte, err error) {
|
||
key, ok := priv.(crypto.Signer)
|
||
if !ok {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("x509: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Signer")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
signatureAlgorithm, algorithmIdentifier, err := signingParamsForKey(key, template.SignatureAlgorithm)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
var publicKeyBytes []byte
|
||
var publicKeyAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
|
||
publicKeyBytes, publicKeyAlgorithm, err = marshalPublicKey(key.Public())
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
extensions, err := buildCSRExtensions(template)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Make a copy of template.Attributes because we may alter it below.
|
||
attributes := make([]pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET, 0, len(template.Attributes))
|
||
for _, attr := range template.Attributes {
|
||
values := make([][]pkix.AttributeTypeAndValue, len(attr.Value))
|
||
copy(values, attr.Value)
|
||
attributes = append(attributes, pkix.AttributeTypeAndValueSET{
|
||
Type: attr.Type,
|
||
Value: values,
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
extensionsAppended := false
|
||
if len(extensions) > 0 {
|
||
// Append the extensions to an existing attribute if possible.
|
||
for _, atvSet := range attributes {
|
||
if !atvSet.Type.Equal(oidExtensionRequest) || len(atvSet.Value) == 0 {
|
||
continue
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// specifiedExtensions contains all the extensions that we
|
||
// found specified via template.Attributes.
|
||
specifiedExtensions := make(map[string]bool)
|
||
|
||
for _, atvs := range atvSet.Value {
|
||
for _, atv := range atvs {
|
||
specifiedExtensions[atv.Type.String()] = true
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
newValue := make([]pkix.AttributeTypeAndValue, 0, len(atvSet.Value[0])+len(extensions))
|
||
newValue = append(newValue, atvSet.Value[0]...)
|
||
|
||
for _, e := range extensions {
|
||
if specifiedExtensions[e.Id.String()] {
|
||
// Attributes already contained a value for
|
||
// this extension and it takes priority.
|
||
continue
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
newValue = append(newValue, pkix.AttributeTypeAndValue{
|
||
// There is no place for the critical
|
||
// flag in an AttributeTypeAndValue.
|
||
Type: e.Id,
|
||
Value: e.Value,
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
atvSet.Value[0] = newValue
|
||
extensionsAppended = true
|
||
break
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
rawAttributes, err := newRawAttributes(attributes)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// If not included in attributes, add a new attribute for the
|
||
// extensions.
|
||
if len(extensions) > 0 && !extensionsAppended {
|
||
attr := struct {
|
||
Type asn1.ObjectIdentifier
|
||
Value [][]pkix.Extension `asn1:"set"`
|
||
}{
|
||
Type: oidExtensionRequest,
|
||
Value: [][]pkix.Extension{extensions},
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
b, err := asn1.Marshal(attr)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("x509: failed to serialise extensions attribute: " + err.Error())
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
var rawValue asn1.RawValue
|
||
if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(b, &rawValue); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
rawAttributes = append(rawAttributes, rawValue)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
asn1Subject := template.RawSubject
|
||
if len(asn1Subject) == 0 {
|
||
asn1Subject, err = asn1.Marshal(template.Subject.ToRDNSequence())
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
tbsCSR := tbsCertificateRequest{
|
||
Version: 0, // PKCS #10, RFC 2986
|
||
Subject: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: asn1Subject},
|
||
PublicKey: publicKeyInfo{
|
||
Algorithm: publicKeyAlgorithm,
|
||
PublicKey: asn1.BitString{
|
||
Bytes: publicKeyBytes,
|
||
BitLength: len(publicKeyBytes) * 8,
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
RawAttributes: rawAttributes,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
tbsCSRContents, err := asn1.Marshal(tbsCSR)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
tbsCSR.Raw = tbsCSRContents
|
||
|
||
signature, err := signTBS(tbsCSRContents, key, signatureAlgorithm, rand)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return asn1.Marshal(certificateRequest{
|
||
TBSCSR: tbsCSR,
|
||
SignatureAlgorithm: algorithmIdentifier,
|
||
SignatureValue: asn1.BitString{
|
||
Bytes: signature,
|
||
BitLength: len(signature) * 8,
|
||
},
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ParseCertificateRequest parses a single certificate request from the
|
||
// given ASN.1 DER data.
|
||
func ParseCertificateRequest(asn1Data []byte) (*CertificateRequest, error) {
|
||
var csr certificateRequest
|
||
|
||
rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(asn1Data, &csr)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
} else if len(rest) != 0 {
|
||
return nil, asn1.SyntaxError{Msg: "trailing data"}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return parseCertificateRequest(&csr)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ParseCertificateRequestPEM parses a single certificate request from the
|
||
// given PEM data.
|
||
func ParseCertificateRequestPEM(data []byte) (*CertificateRequest, error) {
|
||
block, _ := pem.Decode(data)
|
||
if block == nil {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("failed to decode PEM block containing CSR")
|
||
}
|
||
return ParseCertificateRequest(block.Bytes)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func parseCertificateRequest(in *certificateRequest) (*CertificateRequest, error) {
|
||
out := &CertificateRequest{
|
||
Raw: in.Raw,
|
||
RawTBSCertificateRequest: in.TBSCSR.Raw,
|
||
RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo: in.TBSCSR.PublicKey.Raw,
|
||
RawSubject: in.TBSCSR.Subject.FullBytes,
|
||
|
||
Signature: in.SignatureValue.RightAlign(),
|
||
SignatureAlgorithm: getSignatureAlgorithmFromAI(in.SignatureAlgorithm),
|
||
|
||
PublicKeyAlgorithm: getPublicKeyAlgorithmFromOID(in.TBSCSR.PublicKey.Algorithm.Algorithm),
|
||
|
||
Version: in.TBSCSR.Version,
|
||
Attributes: parseRawAttributes(in.TBSCSR.RawAttributes),
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
var err error
|
||
if out.PublicKeyAlgorithm != UnknownPublicKeyAlgorithm {
|
||
out.PublicKey, err = parsePublicKey(&in.TBSCSR.PublicKey)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
var subject pkix.RDNSequence
|
||
if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(in.TBSCSR.Subject.FullBytes, &subject); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
} else if len(rest) != 0 {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("x509: trailing data after X.509 Subject")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
out.Subject.FillFromRDNSequence(&subject)
|
||
|
||
if out.Extensions, err = parseCSRExtensions(in.TBSCSR.RawAttributes); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
for _, extension := range out.Extensions {
|
||
switch {
|
||
case extension.Id.Equal(oidExtensionSubjectAltName):
|
||
out.DNSNames, out.EmailAddresses, out.IPAddresses, out.URIs, err = parseSANExtension(extension.Value)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// CheckSignature reports whether the signature on c is valid.
|
||
func (c *CertificateRequest) CheckSignature() error {
|
||
return checkSignature(c.SignatureAlgorithm, c.RawTBSCertificateRequest, c.Signature, c.PublicKey, true)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// These structures reflect the ASN.1 structure of X.509 CRLs better than
|
||
// the existing crypto/x509/pkix variants do. These mirror the existing
|
||
// certificate structs in this file.
|
||
//
|
||
// Notably, we include issuer as an asn1.RawValue, mirroring the behavior of
|
||
// tbsCertificate and allowing raw (unparsed) subjects to be passed cleanly.
|
||
type certificateList struct {
|
||
TBSCertList tbsCertificateList
|
||
SignatureAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
|
||
SignatureValue asn1.BitString
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
type tbsCertificateList struct {
|
||
Raw asn1.RawContent
|
||
Version int `asn1:"optional,default:0"`
|
||
Signature pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
|
||
Issuer asn1.RawValue
|
||
ThisUpdate time.Time
|
||
NextUpdate time.Time `asn1:"optional"`
|
||
RevokedCertificates []pkix.RevokedCertificate `asn1:"optional"`
|
||
Extensions []pkix.Extension `asn1:"tag:0,optional,explicit"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// CreateRevocationList creates a new X.509 v2 Certificate Revocation List,
|
||
// according to RFC 5280, based on template.
|
||
//
|
||
// The CRL is signed by priv which should be the private key associated with
|
||
// the public key in the issuer certificate.
|
||
//
|
||
// The issuer may not be nil, and the crlSign bit must be set in KeyUsage in
|
||
// order to use it as a CRL issuer.
|
||
//
|
||
// The issuer distinguished name CRL field and authority key identifier
|
||
// extension are populated using the issuer certificate. issuer must have
|
||
// SubjectKeyId set.
|
||
func CreateRevocationList(rand io.Reader, template *x509.RevocationList, issuer *Certificate, priv crypto.Signer) ([]byte, error) {
|
||
if template == nil {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("x509: template can not be nil")
|
||
}
|
||
if issuer == nil {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("x509: issuer can not be nil")
|
||
}
|
||
if (issuer.KeyUsage & KeyUsageCRLSign) == 0 {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("x509: issuer must have the crlSign key usage bit set")
|
||
}
|
||
if len(issuer.SubjectKeyId) == 0 {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("x509: issuer certificate doesn't contain a subject key identifier")
|
||
}
|
||
if template.NextUpdate.Before(template.ThisUpdate) {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("x509: template.ThisUpdate is after template.NextUpdate")
|
||
}
|
||
if template.Number == nil {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("x509: template contains nil Number field")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
signatureAlgorithm, algorithmIdentifier, err := signingParamsForKey(priv, template.SignatureAlgorithm)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
var revokedCerts []pkix.RevokedCertificate
|
||
revokedCerts = make([]pkix.RevokedCertificate, len(template.RevokedCertificates))
|
||
for i, rc := range template.RevokedCertificates {
|
||
rc.RevocationTime = rc.RevocationTime.UTC()
|
||
revokedCerts[i] = rc
|
||
}
|
||
/*
|
||
// Only process the deprecated RevokedCertificates field if it is populated
|
||
// and the new RevokedCertificateEntries field is not populated.
|
||
if len(template.RevokedCertificates) > 0 && len(template.RevokedCertificateEntries) == 0 {
|
||
// Force revocation times to UTC per RFC 5280.
|
||
revokedCerts = make([]pkix.RevokedCertificate, len(template.RevokedCertificates))
|
||
for i, rc := range template.RevokedCertificates {
|
||
rc.RevocationTime = rc.RevocationTime.UTC()
|
||
revokedCerts[i] = rc
|
||
}
|
||
} else {
|
||
// Convert the ReasonCode field to a proper extension, and force revocation
|
||
// times to UTC per RFC 5280.
|
||
revokedCerts = make([]pkix.RevokedCertificate, len(template.RevokedCertificateEntries))
|
||
for i, rce := range template.RevokedCertificateEntries {
|
||
if rce.SerialNumber == nil {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("x509: template contains entry with nil SerialNumber field")
|
||
}
|
||
if rce.RevocationTime.IsZero() {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("x509: template contains entry with zero RevocationTime field")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
rc := pkix.RevokedCertificate{
|
||
SerialNumber: rce.SerialNumber,
|
||
RevocationTime: rce.RevocationTime.UTC(),
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Copy over any extra extensions, except for a Reason Code extension,
|
||
// because we'll synthesize that ourselves to ensure it is correct.
|
||
exts := make([]pkix.Extension, 0, len(rce.ExtraExtensions))
|
||
for _, ext := range rce.ExtraExtensions {
|
||
if ext.Id.Equal(oidExtensionReasonCode) {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("x509: template contains entry with ReasonCode ExtraExtension; use ReasonCode field instead")
|
||
}
|
||
exts = append(exts, ext)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Only add a reasonCode extension if the reason is non-zero, as per
|
||
// RFC 5280 Section 5.3.1.
|
||
if rce.ReasonCode != 0 {
|
||
reasonBytes, err := asn1.Marshal(asn1.Enumerated(rce.ReasonCode))
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
exts = append(exts, pkix.Extension{
|
||
Id: oidExtensionReasonCode,
|
||
Value: reasonBytes,
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if len(exts) > 0 {
|
||
rc.Extensions = exts
|
||
}
|
||
revokedCerts[i] = rc
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
aki, err := asn1.Marshal(authKeyId{Id: issuer.SubjectKeyId})
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
if numBytes := template.Number.Bytes(); len(numBytes) > 20 || (len(numBytes) == 20 && numBytes[0]&0x80 != 0) {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("x509: CRL number exceeds 20 octets")
|
||
}
|
||
crlNum, err := asn1.Marshal(template.Number)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Correctly use the issuer's subject sequence if one is specified.
|
||
issuerSubject, err := subjectBytes(issuer.asX509())
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
tbsCertList := tbsCertificateList{
|
||
Version: 1, // v2
|
||
Signature: algorithmIdentifier,
|
||
Issuer: asn1.RawValue{FullBytes: issuerSubject},
|
||
ThisUpdate: template.ThisUpdate.UTC(),
|
||
NextUpdate: template.NextUpdate.UTC(),
|
||
Extensions: []pkix.Extension{
|
||
{
|
||
Id: oidExtensionAuthorityKeyId,
|
||
Value: aki,
|
||
},
|
||
{
|
||
Id: oidExtensionCRLNumber,
|
||
Value: crlNum,
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
if len(revokedCerts) > 0 {
|
||
tbsCertList.RevokedCertificates = revokedCerts
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if len(template.ExtraExtensions) > 0 {
|
||
tbsCertList.Extensions = append(tbsCertList.Extensions, template.ExtraExtensions...)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
tbsCertListContents, err := asn1.Marshal(tbsCertList)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Optimization to only marshal this struct once, when signing and
|
||
// then embedding in certificateList below.
|
||
tbsCertList.Raw = tbsCertListContents
|
||
|
||
signature, err := signTBS(tbsCertListContents, priv, signatureAlgorithm, rand)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return asn1.Marshal(certificateList{
|
||
TBSCertList: tbsCertList,
|
||
SignatureAlgorithm: algorithmIdentifier,
|
||
SignatureValue: asn1.BitString{Bytes: signature, BitLength: len(signature) * 8},
|
||
})
|
||
}
|