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Merge pull request #22 from easyops-cn/polish

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[X509] sync upstream
This commit is contained in:
Sun Yimin 2022-02-08 17:12:27 +08:00 committed by GitHub
commit 6c068d4e1e
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GPG Key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
6 changed files with 209 additions and 180 deletions
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13
smx509/parser.go
View File

@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ func isPrintable(b byte) bool {
}
// parseASN1String parses the ASN.1 string types T61String, PrintableString,
// UTF8String, BMPString, and IA5String. This is mostly copied from the
// respective encoding/asn1.parse... methods, rather than just increasing
// the API surface of that package.
// UTF8String, BMPString, IA5String, and NumericString. This is mostly copied
// from the respective encoding/asn1.parse... methods, rather than just
// increasing the API surface of that package.
func parseASN1String(tag cryptobyte_asn1.Tag, value []byte) (string, error) {
switch tag {
case cryptobyte_asn1.T61String:
@ -91,6 +91,13 @@ func parseASN1String(tag cryptobyte_asn1.Tag, value []byte) (string, error) {
return "", errors.New("invalid IA5String")
}
return s, nil
case cryptobyte_asn1.Tag(asn1.TagNumericString):
for _, b := range value {
if !('0' <= b && b <= '9' || b == ' ') {
return "", errors.New("invalid NumericString")
}
}
return string(value), nil
}
return "", fmt.Errorf("unsupported string type: %v", tag)
}

33
smx509/pkcs1.go Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
package smx509
import "math/big"
// pkcs1PrivateKey is a structure which mirrors the PKCS #1 ASN.1 for an RSA private key.
type pkcs1PrivateKey struct {
Version int
N *big.Int
E int
D *big.Int
P *big.Int
Q *big.Int
// We ignore these values, if present, because rsa will calculate them.
Dp *big.Int `asn1:"optional"`
Dq *big.Int `asn1:"optional"`
Qinv *big.Int `asn1:"optional"`
AdditionalPrimes []pkcs1AdditionalRSAPrime `asn1:"optional,omitempty"`
}
type pkcs1AdditionalRSAPrime struct {
Prime *big.Int
// We ignore these values because rsa will calculate them.
Exp *big.Int
Coeff *big.Int
}
// pkcs1PublicKey reflects the ASN.1 structure of a PKCS #1 public key.
type pkcs1PublicKey struct {
N *big.Int
E int
}

24
smx509/sec1.go
View File

@ -11,30 +11,6 @@ import (
"github.com/emmansun/gmsm/sm2"
)
// pkcs1PrivateKey is a structure which mirrors the PKCS#1 ASN.1 for an RSA private key.
type pkcs1PrivateKey struct {
Version int
N *big.Int
E int
D *big.Int
P *big.Int
Q *big.Int
// We ignore these values, if present, because rsa will calculate them.
Dp *big.Int `asn1:"optional"`
Dq *big.Int `asn1:"optional"`
Qinv *big.Int `asn1:"optional"`
AdditionalPrimes []pkcs1AdditionalRSAPrime `asn1:"optional,omitempty"`
}
type pkcs1AdditionalRSAPrime struct {
Prime *big.Int
// We ignore these values because rsa will calculate them.
Exp *big.Int
Coeff *big.Int
}
const ecPrivKeyVersion = 1
// ecPrivateKey reflects an ASN.1 Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.

289
smx509/verify.go
View File

@ -244,6 +244,143 @@ func parseRFC2821Mailbox(in string) (mailbox rfc2821Mailbox, ok bool) {
return mailbox, true
}
// domainToReverseLabels converts a textual domain name like foo.example.com to
// the list of labels in reverse order, e.g. ["com", "example", "foo"].
func domainToReverseLabels(domain string) (reverseLabels []string, ok bool) {
for len(domain) > 0 {
if i := strings.LastIndexByte(domain, '.'); i == -1 {
reverseLabels = append(reverseLabels, domain)
domain = ""
} else {
reverseLabels = append(reverseLabels, domain[i+1:])
domain = domain[:i]
}
}
if len(reverseLabels) > 0 && len(reverseLabels[0]) == 0 {
// An empty label at the end indicates an absolute value.
return nil, false
}
for _, label := range reverseLabels {
if len(label) == 0 {
// Empty labels are otherwise invalid.
return nil, false
}
for _, c := range label {
if c < 33 || c > 126 {
// Invalid character.
return nil, false
}
}
}
return reverseLabels, true
}
func matchEmailConstraint(mailbox rfc2821Mailbox, constraint string) (bool, error) {
// If the constraint contains an @, then it specifies an exact mailbox
// name.
if strings.Contains(constraint, "@") {
constraintMailbox, ok := parseRFC2821Mailbox(constraint)
if !ok {
return false, fmt.Errorf("x509: internal error: cannot parse constraint %q", constraint)
}
return mailbox.local == constraintMailbox.local && strings.EqualFold(mailbox.domain, constraintMailbox.domain), nil
}
// Otherwise the constraint is like a DNS constraint of the domain part
// of the mailbox.
return matchDomainConstraint(mailbox.domain, constraint)
}
func matchURIConstraint(uri *url.URL, constraint string) (bool, error) {
// From RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.10:
// “a uniformResourceIdentifier that does not include an authority
// component with a host name specified as a fully qualified domain
// name (e.g., if the URI either does not include an authority
// component or includes an authority component in which the host name
// is specified as an IP address), then the application MUST reject the
// certificate.”
host := uri.Host
if len(host) == 0 {
return false, fmt.Errorf("URI with empty host (%q) cannot be matched against constraints", uri.String())
}
if strings.Contains(host, ":") && !strings.HasSuffix(host, "]") {
var err error
host, _, err = net.SplitHostPort(uri.Host)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
}
if strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") && strings.HasSuffix(host, "]") ||
net.ParseIP(host) != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("URI with IP (%q) cannot be matched against constraints", uri.String())
}
return matchDomainConstraint(host, constraint)
}
func matchIPConstraint(ip net.IP, constraint *net.IPNet) (bool, error) {
if len(ip) != len(constraint.IP) {
return false, nil
}
for i := range ip {
if mask := constraint.Mask[i]; ip[i]&mask != constraint.IP[i]&mask {
return false, nil
}
}
return true, nil
}
func matchDomainConstraint(domain, constraint string) (bool, error) {
// The meaning of zero length constraints is not specified, but this
// code follows NSS and accepts them as matching everything.
if len(constraint) == 0 {
return true, nil
}
domainLabels, ok := domainToReverseLabels(domain)
if !ok {
return false, fmt.Errorf("x509: internal error: cannot parse domain %q", domain)
}
// RFC 5280 says that a leading period in a domain name means that at
// least one label must be prepended, but only for URI and email
// constraints, not DNS constraints. The code also supports that
// behaviour for DNS constraints.
mustHaveSubdomains := false
if constraint[0] == '.' {
mustHaveSubdomains = true
constraint = constraint[1:]
}
constraintLabels, ok := domainToReverseLabels(constraint)
if !ok {
return false, fmt.Errorf("x509: internal error: cannot parse domain %q", constraint)
}
if len(domainLabels) < len(constraintLabels) ||
(mustHaveSubdomains && len(domainLabels) == len(constraintLabels)) {
return false, nil
}
for i, constraintLabel := range constraintLabels {
if !strings.EqualFold(constraintLabel, domainLabels[i]) {
return false, nil
}
}
return true, nil
}
// checkNameConstraints checks that c permits a child certificate to claim the
// given name, of type nameType. The argument parsedName contains the parsed
// form of name, suitable for passing to the match function. The total number
@ -304,41 +441,6 @@ func (c *Certificate) checkNameConstraints(count *int,
return nil
}
// domainToReverseLabels converts a textual domain name like foo.example.com to
// the list of labels in reverse order, e.g. ["com", "example", "foo"].
func domainToReverseLabels(domain string) (reverseLabels []string, ok bool) {
for len(domain) > 0 {
if i := strings.LastIndexByte(domain, '.'); i == -1 {
reverseLabels = append(reverseLabels, domain)
domain = ""
} else {
reverseLabels = append(reverseLabels, domain[i+1:])
domain = domain[:i]
}
}
if len(reverseLabels) > 0 && len(reverseLabels[0]) == 0 {
// An empty label at the end indicates an absolute value.
return nil, false
}
for _, label := range reverseLabels {
if len(label) == 0 {
// Empty labels are otherwise invalid.
return nil, false
}
for _, c := range label {
if c < 33 || c > 126 {
// Invalid character.
return nil, false
}
}
}
return reverseLabels, true
}
// isValid performs validity checks on c given that it is a candidate to append
// to the chain in currentChain.
func (c *Certificate) isValid(certType int, currentChain []*Certificate, opts *VerifyOptions) error {
@ -501,6 +603,12 @@ func (c *Certificate) isValid(certType int, currentChain []*Certificate, opts *V
// the name being validated. Note that DirectoryName constraints are not
// supported.
//
// Name constraint validation follows the rules from RFC 5280, with the
// addition that DNS name constraints may use the leading period format
// defined for emails and URIs. When a constraint has a leading period
// it indicates that at least one additional label must be prepended to
// the constrained name to be considered valid.
//
// Extended Key Usage values are enforced nested down a chain, so an intermediate
// or root that enumerates EKUs prevents a leaf from asserting an EKU not in that
// list. (While this is not specified, it is common practice in order to limit
@ -523,8 +631,8 @@ func (c *Certificate) Verify(opts VerifyOptions) (chains [][]*Certificate, err e
}
}
// Use Windows's own verification and chain building.
if opts.Roots == nil && runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
// Use platform verifiers, where available, if Roots is from SystemCertPool.
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
if opts.Roots == nil {
return c.systemVerify(&opts)
}
@ -600,7 +708,7 @@ func appendToFreshChain(chain []*Certificate, cert *Certificate) []*Certificate
}
// maxChainSignatureChecks is the maximum number of CheckSignatureFrom calls
// that an invocation of buildChains will (tranistively) make. Most chains are
// that an invocation of buildChains will (transitively) make. Most chains are
// less than 15 certificates long, so this leaves space for multiple chains and
// for failed checks due to different intermediates having the same Subject.
const maxChainSignatureChecks = 100
@ -713,7 +821,7 @@ func validHostname(host string, isPattern bool) bool {
continue
}
if c == '_' {
// Not valid characters in hostnames, but commonly
// Not a valid character in hostnames, but commonly
// found in deployments outside the WebPKI.
continue
}
@ -835,6 +943,7 @@ func (c *Certificate) VerifyHostname(h string) error {
}
}
}
return x509.HostnameError{Certificate: c.asX509(), Host: h}
}
@ -899,105 +1008,3 @@ NextCert:
return true
}
func matchEmailConstraint(mailbox rfc2821Mailbox, constraint string) (bool, error) {
// If the constraint contains an @, then it specifies an exact mailbox
// name.
if strings.Contains(constraint, "@") {
constraintMailbox, ok := parseRFC2821Mailbox(constraint)
if !ok {
return false, fmt.Errorf("x509: internal error: cannot parse constraint %q", constraint)
}
return mailbox.local == constraintMailbox.local && strings.EqualFold(mailbox.domain, constraintMailbox.domain), nil
}
// Otherwise the constraint is like a DNS constraint of the domain part
// of the mailbox.
return matchDomainConstraint(mailbox.domain, constraint)
}
func matchURIConstraint(uri *url.URL, constraint string) (bool, error) {
// From RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.10:
// “a uniformResourceIdentifier that does not include an authority
// component with a host name specified as a fully qualified domain
// name (e.g., if the URI either does not include an authority
// component or includes an authority component in which the host name
// is specified as an IP address), then the application MUST reject the
// certificate.”
host := uri.Host
if len(host) == 0 {
return false, fmt.Errorf("URI with empty host (%q) cannot be matched against constraints", uri.String())
}
if strings.Contains(host, ":") && !strings.HasSuffix(host, "]") {
var err error
host, _, err = net.SplitHostPort(uri.Host)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
}
if strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") && strings.HasSuffix(host, "]") ||
net.ParseIP(host) != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("URI with IP (%q) cannot be matched against constraints", uri.String())
}
return matchDomainConstraint(host, constraint)
}
func matchIPConstraint(ip net.IP, constraint *net.IPNet) (bool, error) {
if len(ip) != len(constraint.IP) {
return false, nil
}
for i := range ip {
if mask := constraint.Mask[i]; ip[i]&mask != constraint.IP[i]&mask {
return false, nil
}
}
return true, nil
}
func matchDomainConstraint(domain, constraint string) (bool, error) {
// The meaning of zero length constraints is not specified, but this
// code follows NSS and accepts them as matching everything.
if len(constraint) == 0 {
return true, nil
}
domainLabels, ok := domainToReverseLabels(domain)
if !ok {
return false, fmt.Errorf("x509: internal error: cannot parse domain %q", domain)
}
// RFC 5280 says that a leading period in a domain name means that at
// least one label must be prepended, but only for URI and email
// constraints, not DNS constraints. The code also supports that
// behaviour for DNS constraints.
mustHaveSubdomains := false
if constraint[0] == '.' {
mustHaveSubdomains = true
constraint = constraint[1:]
}
constraintLabels, ok := domainToReverseLabels(constraint)
if !ok {
return false, fmt.Errorf("x509: internal error: cannot parse domain %q", constraint)
}
if len(domainLabels) < len(constraintLabels) ||
(mustHaveSubdomains && len(domainLabels) == len(constraintLabels)) {
return false, nil
}
for i, constraintLabel := range constraintLabels {
if !strings.EqualFold(constraintLabel, domainLabels[i]) {
return false, nil
}
}
return true, nil
}

22
smx509/x509.go
View File

@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ type pkixPublicKey struct {
}
// ParsePKIXPublicKey parses a public key in PKIX, ASN.1 DER form.
// The encoded public key is a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure
// (see RFC 5280, Section 4.1).
//
// It returns a *rsa.PublicKey, *dsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey, or
// ed25519.PublicKey. More types might be supported in the future.
@ -119,6 +121,8 @@ func marshalPublicKey(pub interface{}) (publicKeyBytes []byte, publicKeyAlgorith
}
// MarshalPKIXPublicKey converts a public key to PKIX, ASN.1 DER form.
// The encoded public key is a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure
// (see RFC 5280, Section 4.1).
//
// The following key types are currently supported: *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey
// and ed25519.PublicKey. Unsupported key types result in an error.
@ -238,12 +242,6 @@ const (
Ed25519 = x509.Ed25519
)
// pkcs1PublicKey reflects the ASN.1 structure of a PKCS#1 public key.
type pkcs1PublicKey struct {
N *big.Int
E int
}
var signatureAlgorithmDetails = []struct {
algo SignatureAlgorithm
name string
@ -1256,7 +1254,7 @@ func signingParamsForPublicKey(pub interface{}, requestedSigAlgo SignatureAlgori
var emptyASN1Subject = []byte{0x30, 0}
// CreateCertificate creates a new X.509 v3 certificate based on a template.
// The following members of template are used:
// The following members of template are currently used:
//
// - AuthorityKeyId
// - BasicConstraintsValid
@ -1293,7 +1291,7 @@ var emptyASN1Subject = []byte{0x30, 0}
//
// The certificate is signed by parent. If parent is equal to template then the
// certificate is self-signed. The parameter pub is the public key of the
// signee and priv is the private key of the signer.
// certificate to be generated and priv is the private key of the signer.
//
// The returned slice is the certificate in DER encoding.
//
@ -1304,6 +1302,9 @@ var emptyASN1Subject = []byte{0x30, 0}
// The AuthorityKeyId will be taken from the SubjectKeyId of parent, if any,
// unless the resulting certificate is self-signed. Otherwise the value from
// template will be used.
//
// If SubjectKeyId from template is empty and the template is a CA, SubjectKeyId
// will be generated from the hash of the public key.
func CreateCertificate(rand io.Reader, template, parent *x509.Certificate, pub, priv interface{}) ([]byte, error) {
key, ok := priv.(crypto.Signer)
if !ok {
@ -1395,6 +1396,7 @@ func CreateCertificate(rand io.Reader, template, parent *x509.Certificate, pub,
h.Write(signed)
signed = h.Sum(nil)
}
var signerOpts crypto.SignerOpts = hashFunc
if template.SignatureAlgorithm != 0 && isRSAPSS(template.SignatureAlgorithm) {
signerOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{
@ -1449,6 +1451,9 @@ func ParseDERCRL(derBytes []byte) (*pkix.CertificateList, error) {
// CreateCRL returns a DER encoded CRL, signed by this Certificate, that
// contains the given list of revoked certificates.
//
// Note: this method does not generate an RFC 5280 conformant X.509 v2 CRL.
// To generate a standards compliant CRL, use CreateRevocationList instead.
func (c *Certificate) CreateCRL(rand io.Reader, priv interface{}, revokedCerts []pkix.RevokedCertificate, now, expiry time.Time) (crlBytes []byte, err error) {
key, ok := priv.(crypto.Signer)
if !ok {
@ -1624,6 +1629,7 @@ func CreateCertificateRequest(rand io.Reader, template *x509.CertificateRequest,
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New("x509: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Signer")
}
var hashFunc crypto.Hash
var sigAlgo pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
hashFunc, sigAlgo, err = signingParamsForPublicKey(key.Public(), template.SignatureAlgorithm)